Georgia

Georgia has never participated in UN peacekeeping operations. The main reason for not sending troops resides in its political environment and foreign policy agenda, “despite the fact that Georgia managed a peaceful, if dramatic, transfer of power in November 2003, ousting President Eduard Shevardnadze, a former Soviet foreign minister and Georgian leader since the early 1990s” (ICG 2006, par. 1). Currently, Georgia has the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), “established in August 1993 to verify compliance with the ceasefire agreement between the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities in Georgia” (UN 2006c, par. 1). UNOMIG’s mandate was expanded following the signing by the parties of the 1994 Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces (Ibid.).

Initial variables of the data collection process:

UN/UN peacekeeping policy reform
No record.

Perception of peacekeeping
Russian peacekeepers have operated there since the early 1990s (BBC 2006s, par. 4). They are regularly accused by Tbilisi of siding with the separatists (Ibid.). The Georgian parliament has demanded that the Russian peacekeepers in both regions be replaced by an international force (Ibid.). The UN operates a military observer mission alongside Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia (Ibid.).

Domestic political environment
Georgia managed a peaceful, if dramatic, transfer of power in November 2003 (ICG 2006, par. 1). The scale of western-oriented Mikhail Saakashvili’s subsequent electoral victory in January 2004 was widely seen as a vote for change in the Caucasian republic, but Georgia’s governance problems will not be easily solved (Ibid.). The scope for conflict remains (Ibid.).

Saakashvili won early success May 2004, reaffirming Georgia’s control over the breakaway province of Ajara and sending strongman Aslan Abashidze into exile. But Ajara was always the least intractable of Georgia’s territorial conflicts. It is far less clear that the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are so willing to rejoin Georgia. (Ibid., par. 3)

In the near future, the political scene will be dominated by the president, Mikhail Saakashvili (EIU 2006bn, 1).

Domestic economic environment
A substantial amount of the industrial infrastructure built in Georgia in the Soviet era is, in effect, obsolete at world market prices, although a few of the metallurgical and transport engineering plants appear to be viable (EIU 2006q, 19). Official statistics indicate that at least 30% of economic activity takes place in the shadow economy (Ibid., 20). Various studies carried out over the past few years suggest that Georgia had one of the largest shadow economies in the former Soviet Union, with some estimates indicating that it was as large as the official economy itself (Ibid.).

Military affairs
The IISS states that in 2004 the Georgian military consisted of an army numbering 8,620 persons, a navy of 2,000 and an air force of 1,350 (Ibid. quoting IISS 2004).

The army has about 90 tanks and 185 other armored vehicles. The air force’s complement of fixed-wing combat aircraft consists of seven Su-25 ground-attack planes and 15 helicopters. The navy has 11 patrol boats, some of them donated by Western countries. The government has increased the defence budget significantly over the past two years in an attempt to bring the armed forces up towards NATO standards. (Ibid.)

Foreign policy
Saakashvili has repeatedly stated that his policy will have a westward orientation, while stressing that he will also take Russia’s interests into account, provided that Russia respects Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (EIU 2006q, 12). Saakashvili would like to orient Georgia towards the EU in particular (Ibid.).

The EU appointed its first .special representative to the south Caucasus in mid-2003, and the European Commission’s decision to include the South Caucasus in its European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is an indication that the EU is considering closer ties. Through the ENP the EU aims to broaden co-operation with countries that now lie closer to the EU’s borders following the EU’s expansion in May 2004. However, during 2006 Georgia moved closer to concluding an Action Plan with the EU that sets out specific aspects of the relationship. The EU has signaled its intention to become more engaged in the processes of conflict resolution in the South Caucasus, although perhaps not as extensively as the Georgian government might desire. The government achieved another milestone when NATO began a phase of "intensified dialogue" with Georgia in September 2006. This is considered a stepping stone towards full membership, although it is not a guarantee of it. (Ibid.)

The US also provides significant military assistance to Georgia and has deployed special forces in the country since 2001 to train Georgia’s military in counter-terrorism operations (EIU 2006q, 13).

The move was in response to evidence that members of al-Qaeda were present in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, which lies to the south of Russia’s breakaway republic of Chechnya. The US believes that links between al-Qaeda and some Chechen separatists had led to the gorge being used as a hiding place by the terrorist organization. The US is helping to equip the units being trained, but does not take part in military operations. Georgia has periodically carried out military operations in the area since mid-2002, in order either to capture or force al-Qaeda and the Chechen separatists to leave. (Ibid.)

Additional variables found after the preliminary analysis:

Climate changes
No record.

Independent negotiations taken by DPKO to seek troops
No record.

Independent negotiations taken by contributor countries to engage non-contributor countries
No record.

Meetings organized by other international organizations to engage in dialogue about peacekeeping
No record.